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Abstract
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, elites seeking political power in the newly independent 
Qazaqstan fostered the use of clan affiliations, such as ‘Zhuz’ and ‘Ru’, in order to develop a 
Qazaq identity. However, this change resulted in clan politics at both the elite and individual 
levels, which have become an integral part of today’s clan divisions in modern Qazaq society. 
The main purpose of this paper is to explore how contemporary young Qazaqs perceive Zhuz 
and Ru clan-based kinship divisions to affect them. The research objectives of this work are 
achieved through an extensive review of the relevant literature, as well as through a careful 
analysis of the outcomes of semi-structured interviews (n=20) and online surveys (n=200) with 
young people from Nur-Sultan, Aqtau, and Shymkent. This article finds that young Qazaqs 
perceive Zhuz and Ru clans mainly to affect them in terms of employment, marriage, and 
online media.
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1. Introduction
Clan divisions continue to affect power relations in a wide range of contexts in the contemporary 
world (Schatz, 2004, p. ix). This can be observed not only in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe 
but also in the countries of the former Soviet Union. There are numerous clans in Central Asia, 
and despite Sovietisation, clan politics still persist in the modern states there (Collins, 2003, p. 
177). This is especially true for Qazaqstan. The term clan has no precise definition (Minbaeva and 
Muratbekova-Touron, 2013, p. 111), and scholars have interpreted it in different ways depending 
on the contexts in which it occurs. Some scholars perceive ‘clan’ as an enlarged family group with 
blood relation ties (Ning, 2012, p. 122), while others refer to clans as extensive social ‘networks of 
kin and fictive kin ties, or perceived and imagined kinship relations’ (Collins, 2006, p. 25). In this 
article, I will use the following definition presented by Schatz (2004, p. 26): 
“Clan is a division that exists within an ethnic group and in which demonstrable common 
kinship is understood to underlie membership ... and descent is the central operative principle 
of its identity that needs actual genealogical ties.”
In other words, clan is a sub-ethnic division based on common descent and with genealogical 
information to determine membership. This paper analyses the perceived contemporary influences 
of kin-based clans on young people in Qazaqstan. In so doing, the paper concentrates on two 
distinct types of modern clans in Qazaqstan: first, the ‘Zhuz’ (also known as ‘hundred’ or ‘horde’) 
– a major, traditionally and geographically formed umbrella clan of ethnic Qazaqs in Qazaqstan; 
second, ‘Ru’ – a clan of close blood relatives, which can be, but is not always, a subdivision of a 
Zhuz clan. Most Rus are subsets of a Zhuz, making a Zhuz an umbrella clan – that is, hundreds of 
Rus make up a Zhuz. Zhuz and Ru clans originally formed as tribal alliances.
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Since Qazaqstan’s independence from the Soviet Union, the usage of such clan divisions has 
persisted; Ru divisions are especially strong among young Qazaqs (Ramazan, 2015, p. 2; Aqan, 2016; 
Abdikuly, 2017). In the globalised world, these divisions pose certain difficulties for some aspects of 
the economy, politics, and social life in Qazaqstan. Although Zhuzes and Rus provide blood purity, 
cohesion, and traditional values, many people use their affiliations to certain clans as a determinant 
in decision-making, as a tool of patronage, and as a power instrument in various aspects of their 
lives (Junisbai, 2010, p. 237; Kleveman, 2003, cited in Minbaeva and Muratbekova-Touron, 2013, p. 
111). In this regard, the question arises as to whether young people face clan-related challenges 
and/or opportunities in their workplaces, businesses, studies, elections, marriages, and private 
lives. There is no literature that can offer a quick answer to this question; academic literature on 
contemporary Qazaq clans is inconclusive, leaving space for additional research into this topic, 
especially in regard to the perceived effects of Zhuz and Ru on young Qazaqs.
Clans can survive in the context of modernisation and the rise of state bureaucracies over time, 
‘from colonial rule to late colonialism/independence, the transition, and the post-transition 
period’ (Collins, 2004, p. 235). This is especially the case when formal institutions experience an 
‘economy of shortages’ and inefficient markets (Kornai, 1991, cited in Collins, 2004, p. 236). Collins 
asserts that during a regime transition the informal structures of clans allow them to adapt and fill 
various gaps by serving as kin-based networks for political, economic and social exchange. These 
informal structures have allowed for the continued concealment of clan affiliations – a legacy 
of socialism – in post-Soviet Qazaqstan. It is difficult to identify the members and boundaries of 
clans, as they are not formally registered. Clans ‘are not rooted in visible markers […] but rather 
in an exchange of genealogical information’ that defines identity, difference and can take place 
privately (Schatz, 2004, p. xxii). Kin-based clan practices and affiliations thus can be concealed 
from a state that attempts to prosecute clan networks.
The importance and functions of clans change across space and time. For example, according to 
Schatz (2004, p. xxiv), Soviet attempts to exterminate clan divisions were not successful because 
of the nomadic pastoral economy which undergirded the Qazaq clans. After ‘Moscow’s drive to 
bring state control to the exchange of goods (social, economic, or political goods)’ in the Soviet 
period, Qazaq clans reproduced themselves as concealable kin-based divisions (Schatz, 2004, p. 
xxii). This means that clans continued in a concealed form in order to provide access to goods for 
their members in the all-pervading ‘grey market’ that existed under Soviet rule. Thus, concealable 
clan affiliation became useful for Qazaqs and persisted in Soviet times. 
The concealment of clans that became an asset in the 1990s in Qazaqstan further shaped the 
clan-based relations that we witness today. First and foremost, we can see kin-based networks 
that take control of illicit social niches in order to compete for scarce resources, as Schatz (2004, 
p. xxiii) notes in his work. Second, we see a broad discursive battle on the value of clan divisions 
within social networks such as VKontakte and Facebook, online platforms and in public (www.
vk.com, www.facebook.com, www.ratel.kz, www.altyn-orda.kz). Contemporary debates on social 
networks and in social life about clans mainly concern the Qazaqs’ division into Zhuz and Ru clans, 
with many participants arguing that Qazaqs should not divide themselves into clans (Shakhanov, 
2013, p. 5).
However, recent events related to Zhuz and Ru clans have not escaped public attention and show 
that there is a tendency to formalise these clans in order to make them visible. For instance, 
prominent lawyer Zhangeldy Suleymanov recently proposed an initiative to enter clan affiliations 
alongside every citizen’s nationality on Qazaqstani passports and/or ID cards (www.zakon.kz, 
2015). Another example is the ‘Zheti Ata’ (‘Seven Ancestors’) phone application, available on App 
Store, where people can share their stories, text in a chat, search events and see other users’ 
rankings of Rus. This application is widely used by young Qazaqs, according to the ‘Zheti Ata’ 
developer (Prokopenko, 2016), and at one time it became the most downloaded (№1) application in 
the Qazaqstani App Store, outstripping WhatsApp Messenger (Suleimenov, 2016).
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In terms of contemporary international academic literature, scholars have presented diverse 
perspectives on the significance of clans in contemporary Qazaq society, particularly in relation 
to politics. On the one hand, some scholars (e.g. Schatz, 2004; Collins, 2006) argue that clans – 
kinship-based blood ties – are important in understanding the post-Soviet politics of Qazaqstan. 
On the other hand, several scholars (e.g. Luong, 2002; Junisbai & Junisbai, 2005; Isaacs, 2010) argue 
that kinship-based clans do not play the central role in the informal politics of Qazaqstan. Luong 
(2002, p. 52) claims that regionalism ‘has emerged as the most salient political cleavage’ rather 
than tribal divisions. Examining the ‘Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan’ movement, Junisbai and 
Junisbai (2005, p. 373) find that the most important divisions in Qazaqstan are ‘elite cleavages 
based on rival economic interests’ rather than clan or other divisions. Isaacs (2010, p. 18) argues 
that the informal politics of post-Soviet Qazaqstan ‘emerged in response to the uncertainty of 
transition’ rather than ‘cultural legacies bound by kinship identity’. Looking beyond politics, 
Gullette (2007, p. 385) argues that there is a need for more research that focuses on ordinary 
people, not elites, in order to understand their everyday experiences of certain divisions, such 
as clans. The present study is not primarily concerned with politics, and as such does not seek 
to answer the abovementioned political-oriented debates. Instead, following Gullette, it aims to 
understand non-elite young Qazaqs’ perceived everyday experiences of Zhuz and Ru clan divisions 
more generally.
Current debates in Qazaqstan on clan-based kinship divisions seem to be raised mainly, though 
in a limited way, by local scholars in Qazaq-language journals. This can be explained in part by 
the fact that all Qazaq clan relations take place through the Qazaq language and are otherwise 
largely invisible. Moreover, the electronic revolution has produced various new platforms for 
Qazaqs to discuss clan issues, facilitating social exchange in relation to clans. For example, 
Liyassova et al. (2013, pp. 35-36) consider Ru affiliations to be an important phenomenon that is 
currently being revived and moving in a new direction, which they argue is the main hindrance 
to the development of a Qazaq national consciousness. They argue that Ru affiliations lead to a 
special form of protectionism in the selection and placement of personnel. They claim that this 
protectionism continues to be the main driver of employment difficulties, particularly in regions 
and oblasts with large numbers of Qazaqs.
Similarly, Minbaeva and Muratbekova-Touron (2013, p. 109) point out that clannism impacts human 
resource management to a great extent in certain types of companies. Drawing from the results 
of their empirical research, they distinguish and compare three types of companies in Qazaqstan: 
state-owned companies in which clannism has strong effects, privately owned companies with 
moderate influences, and subsidiaries of multinational companies with minor impacts. Another 
author Qabanbay (2016) argues that Qazaq clans allow a confidence in ‘black’ deals, as they do not 
require special membership procedures and clan affiliations are set from birth. He further argues 
that many Qazaqs use their Zhuz and Ru clans as tools to ease the gain of material wealth without 
significant effort; conversely, individuals are likely to ‘fail’ in their chosen careers if they do not 
accept ‘clan games’. In the same vein, Ospan (2017, p. 46) identifies Ru relations as a corruption 
tool that has been adopted at all levels and sectors of society. He gives many examples of clan-
based injustice in sport, education, and science.
Over the past twenty years there have been, in fact, few scholarly works (e.g. Esenova, 1998; 
Masanov, 1998; Luong, 2002; Schatz, 2004; Junisbai and Junisbai, 2005; Collins, 2006; Gullette, 2007; 
Isaacs, 2010) devoted to modern clan politics in Central Asia, particularly Qazaqstan. Globalisation 
has brought many changes to Qazaq society: in particular, the internet, social networks, and 
new media have changed people’s social interactions in terms of acquiring, saving and sharing 
information. Hence, there is a lack of academic literature regarding the effects of such changes 
within Qazaq clans. Moreover, there is no work dedicated to the influence of clans on young people 
in Central Asia. Therefore, the main strength of this paper is that it explores the perceived effects 
of contemporary clan divisions on young people in Qazaqstan for the first time and introduces 
new empirical research about the modern clan divisions of Qazaqstan from the perspective of 
young Qazaqs. This paper supports those (e.g. Gullette, 2007; Abiltain, 2009; Atabaev, 2013) who 
stress that more research is needed to establish a solid understanding of Qazaq clans; their role 
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in contemporary social, economic, and political life; their future prospects; and the challenges 
they represent to post-Soviet democratisation. The results of this article show that young people 
mainly perceive clans to influence them in employment, marriage, and online media.
2. Research background
The main reasons for Zhuz formation were natural-geographical (Barthold, 1911, p. 211) and 
political considerations (Viatkin, 1941, pp. 97-99; Toleubaev et al., 2010, p. 78), as well as interests 
in defending and conserving nomadic territory (Salgarin, 2008, p. 19). Rus were formed because 
of genealogical concerns, which compel Qazaqs to know and recite their seven direct blood 
ancestors and do not allow marriage within seven generations for maintaining the purity of blood 
(History of Qazaqstan: encyclopaedia 2006, p. 641). Before the joining of the Qazaq Khanate to the 
Russian Empire, clans such as Zhuzes and Rus were unconcealed and it was easy to distinguish 
people by their clan affiliations, as each Ru had its own symbol and motto (Bekmakhanov, 1994, 
pp. 97-120). Each of the Qazaq Zhuz clans had its historically established space (Toleubaev et al., 
2010, p. 78). There are three Zhuz clans: the Senior Zhuz (Zhetysu and South Qazaqstan), the Middle 
Zhuz (Central, North, and East Qazaqstan), the Junior Zhuz (West Qazaqstan). Within these three 
Zhuzes, there are twenty main tribes and thousands of Rus (Table 1).
Table 1: ‘Zhuz’ and ‘Ru’ clans of Qazaqstan
Qazaqs
Senior Zhuz Middle Zhuz Junior Zhuz Non-Zhuz Rus
-Dulat
-Shapyrashty
-Oshaqty
-Ysty
-Alban
-Suan
-Saryuisin
-Sirgeli
-Qanly
-Zhalaiyr
-Shanyshqyly
-Argyn
-Naiman
-Qypshaq
-Qonyrat
-Kerei
-Uaq
-Baiuly
-Alimuly
-Zhetiru
e.g.:
-Tore
-Qoja
-Sunaq
-Tolengit
-Nogai-Qazaq
There are thousands of Rus within these twenty main tribes of Zhuzes.
Source: Own design based on the existing literature on Qazaq clans 
However, some Rus such as Tore, Qoja, Sunaq, Tolengit, and Nogai-Qazaq do not belong to Zhuz 
clans, because they belong to ‘Aqsuek’ (elite groups) and/or appeared after the Qazaq Khanate 
had been established (Qazaqstani Encyclopaedia, 2017). Despite this, they also have many Rus as 
their subsets. These non-Zhuz Rus appeared as a result of various historical events: the Mongol 
invasions and conquests (Tore members are descendants of Genghis Khan); Islamic missionary work 
in Central Asia (Qojas and Sunaqs are descendants of Islamic missionaries); and the disintegration 
of the Nogai Horde (Nogai-Qazaqs are those who joined the Qazaq Khanate after the collapse of 
the Nogai Horde).
The social significance of the ‘seven ancestors’ tradition is vital in Qazaq society (Abzhan, 2014, 
p. 58). Abzhan (2014, p. 59) points out that this system is unique and can be considered as a 
branch of Qazaq national culture. There are some Qazaq professors (Medeuov, 2011; Abdibekov, 
2015; Bolsanbek, 2016) who consider the ‘seven ancestors’ system to be a necessity, implying that 
the greater the difference between two people’s ancestors, the more likely their progeny is to have 
pure blood. Abdibekov gives one example in his interview with ‘Aqiqat’ national-political public 
journal in 2015. There, he relates a discussion about the meaning of a Qazaq proverb relating to 
clans in the International Qazaq-Turkish University: 
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“Күйеу – жүз жылдық,
 Құда – мың жылдық.”
[“The groom is for a hundred years,
 The in-law is for a thousand years.”]
The logic behind this proverb is that a couple can live a century, whereas all descendants of a couple 
stay as relatives until the 40th generation (about a thousand years), referring to the role of the 
‘seven ancestors’ system. As Abdibekov (2015, p. 27) notes, after the 40th ancestors, a person’s blood 
becomes spotless. A prime example of an actual clan-based marriage situation is given in the work 
of Qozhambetova (2013). She says a couple from the same Ru who married were harshly criticised 
by the other members of their society, although they had no overlap up to their ninth ancestors; 
however, society members considered their marriage to be a negative example for other young 
people and were against it. Qozhambetova (2013, p. 6) worries that many Rus have already reached 
their 10th-15th generations but still have not produced new Rus, as used to be done in the past. Ospan 
(2017, p. 48) gives another example, saying that researchers in South Korea tested blood samples of 
various world nations. When they tested samples from 43 different Qazaq Rus, they found that all 
the samples could be traced back to a single male ancestor. As a result, they concluded that Kazakh 
blood is the purest blood in the world, proving the importance of the ‘seven ancestors’ tradition.
Therefore, another aspect of the social importance of clans is that they are believed to prevent blood 
illnesses if one follows clan rules in marriage. Genetic disorders and hereditary diseases such as 
Down syndrome, Patau syndrome, Edwards’s syndrome, and Turner syndrome are thought to result 
from ignoring clan rules (Abzhan, 2014, p. 56). Although there is no evidence that such syndromes are 
less prevalent in Qazaqstan, Abzhan bases his claim on the research of the English biologist William 
Bateson and the British geneticist Reginald Crundall Punnett.
There are some unwritten and unchangeable rules that have existed in Qazaq clans for many centuries 
(Shakhanov, 2013, p. 5). A Qazaq person’s Zhuz and/or Ru affiliations are given at birth and cannot 
be chosen or changed by clan rules. The clan affiliations of children born in inter-Ru relations are 
always determined by the paternal line, that is, children will become members of the same clan as 
their fathers. Almost all Qazaq families use Ru as a determinant in marriage and traditional customs. 
Up to the present time, almost every Qazaq knows his or her Ru, and consequently Zhuz, because 
most Rus belong to a certain tribe and Zhuz. This knowledge of Ru and Zhuz belonging creates a 
disconnect between Ru members and non-Qazaq regional elites, such as Russians, in Qazaqstan 
(Kuchins, 2002, p. 233). 
3. Research design
3.1 Research focus
This study focuses on the perceived impacts of Zhuz and Ru clan identities on the experiences of 
young people in Qazaqstan. The research is based on an analysis of online surveys and interviews 
with young Qazaqs from Nur-Sultan, Aqtau, and Shymkent. The central research question explored 
in this paper is: How do young people in Qazaqstan perceive Zhuz and Ru clan-based kinship divisions 
to affect their experiences?
3.2 Research methods and framework for data analysis
The clan is a phenomenon that the majority of people choose to conceal rather than reveal. The 
mixed-method approach is the best way to achieve an in-depth understanding of the evolving 
status of clans in Qazaqstan and to develop generalisable results that allow us to compare the 
findings of both qualitative and quantitative methods. In order to study the main settings of clans’ 
perceived effects on young people, this research takes place through a mixed-method approach 
with an exploratory sequential design. 
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First, I conducted semi-structured interviews to explore young people’s perceptions of the effects 
of clan divisions on their lives, as well as to provide guidance for designing online surveys. Second, I 
developed online surveys with questions informed by the results of the semi-structured interviews. 
This combination of qualitative and quantitative methods produced robust and varied data, while 
providing a variety of ways in which young people could participate in the project. Thus, these two 
methods complemented each other in both data collection and data analysis, which facilitated 
answering the research question.
As the three Zhuzes are regionally dispersed, I conducted the interviews over two months (June 
2017-July 2017) in three different areas: namely in the cities of Nur-Sultan, Aqtau, and Shymkent. I 
chose these three cities for the following reasons: I chose Nur-Sultan because it is located in the 
north (Middle Zhuz region), is the capital and largest city in Qazaqstan, and is a hub for educational 
establishments and youth non-governmental organisations (NGOs). I chose Aqtau because of its 
location in the west of Qazaqstan (Junior Zhuz region) and because of recent political events 
– presumably attached to clannism – that had occurred in the Mangystau oblast. Last, I chose 
Shymkent because it is located in the south (Senior Zhuz region), is the ‘cradle’ of Qazaq culture 
and traditions, and is in the most densely populated oblast of Qazaqstan. I reached my research 
participants through VK (VKontakte – a local version of Facebook) groups and electronic mailing 
lists of universities and youth NGOs in the aforementioned cities. The advert calls for my research 
did not include specific information about clannism in order to minimise participant bias within 
the sample selection. The research eligibility requirements were the following three criteria: (1) 
Qazaq nationality; (2) between the ages of 18 and 29; (3) located in one of the three cities (Nur-
Sultan, Aqtau, and Shymkent).
Summer interviews enabled me to refine and adapt my draft survey questionnaire for autumn 
research. I distributed and collected online surveys via email from September 2017 to January 2018. 
Both surveys and interviews were carried out anonymously in order to increase the quality of the 
research and make participants feel more comfortable with their responses. Overall, 241 people 
responded to my research calls in VK groups and email lists over five months. I excluded partially 
completed and uncompleted online surveys. Of the included respondents, I chose 200 participants 
on the basis of their Zhuz affiliations in order to balance equal representativeness where needed.
Following data collection and transcription, which produced 143 pages of interview data, the 
data were analysed by content and narrative analyses. First, codes were inductively identified in 
the data and attached to transcript pages. Second, codes were sorted and transformed into sub-
themes, identifying similar patterns, phrases, commonalities and/or disparities. Last, sorted sub-
themes were clustered around larger key themes to separate meaningful patterns. As a result, the 
following three key themes were identified from the interviews: 
1. Clan affiliations and employment (including the public sector);
2. Blood purity and progeny health;
3. New platforms for modern Qazaq clans.
The next stage of this research was the quantitative phase, in which the aforementioned three 
topics were translated into empirical indicators and structured in the form of online survey 
questions. 
3.3 General information about the backgrounds of the research participants
There were 20 Qazaq interviewees between the ages of 18 and 29 who participated in semi-
structured interviews in 2017, which lasted from 40 to 59 minutes. ‘Table 2’ shows a breakdown of 
the interviews in three cities and interviewees’ general data such as clan affiliation, age, gender, 
and job experience.
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Table 2: Basic information about the interviews
Nur-Sultan
Candidate 
number Pseudonym Zhuz Age Gender
Job 
experience
Interview 
duration
Interview 
language(s)
001 Dastan Middle 29 Male Yes 59 minutes Qazaq
002 Aigerim Middle 19 Female No 54 minutes Qazaq
003 Serik Middle 19 Male No 46 minutes Qazaq
004 Diana Middle 19 Female Yes 43 minutes Qazaq and Russian
005 Dariga Middle 18 Female No 41 minutes Qazaq
006 Madina Middle 19 Female Yes 40 minutes Qazaq and Russian
007 Bolat Middle 22 Male No 54 minutes Qazaq
Aqtau
Candidate 
number Pseudonym Zhuz Age Gender
Job 
experience
Interview 
duration
Interview 
language(s)
001 Amangeldi Junior 21 Male Yes 42 minutes Qazaq
002 Qairat Junior 25 Male Yes 45 minutes Qazaq
003 Aizhan Junior 22 Female Yes 45 minutes Qazaq
004 Yerzhan Junior 25 Male Yes 50 minutes Qazaq
005 Shoqan Junior 19 Male Yes 45 minutes Qazaq and Russian
006 Aisara Junior 26 Female Yes 59 minutes Qazaq and Russian
Shymkent
Candidate 
number Pseudonym Zhuz Age Gender
Job 
experience
Interview 
duration
Interview 
language(s)
001 Nursultan Senior 24 Male Yes 43 minutes Qazaq
002 Aidar Senior 22 Male Yes 45 minutes Qazaq
003 Samat Senior 22 Male Yes 41 minutes Qazaq
004 Zhibek Senior 22 Female Yes 44 minutes Qazaq
005 Bagila Senior 22 Female Yes 40 minutes Qazaq
006 Abay Senior 29 Male Yes 49 minutes Qazaq
007 Dana Middle 25 Female Yes 57 minutes Qazaq
With regard to the Zhuz affiliation of all online survey participants, the following table can be 
drawn:
Table 3: Umbrella clan (Zhuz) affiliation of participants in online surveys
Umbrella clan (Zhuz) Share
Senior 47.5%
Middle 34%
Junior 12.5%
Non-Zhuz Rus 4.5%
No answer 1.5%
Total 100%
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3.4 Limitations and potential problems
A general limitation of semi-structured (unstructured-conversational) interviews and online 
surveys on clan politics is that a clan is an unofficial phenomenon that many people prefer to 
conceal rather than disclose. For this reason, privacy, concealability, a lack of statistical data, as 
well as unavailable concealed and inaccessible materials were all hindrances to my research. A 
further drawback is a personal bias, as I am Qazaq and a member of Qazaq clans. To minimise 
personal bias, I maintained a neutral and impartial stance on the participants’ responses during 
the qualitative phase of this research. During the interviews, I did not express my own personal 
opinions or feelings and avoided implying that there is a right answer. I also kept detailed records 
and incorporated all data into the report. Moreover, I evaluated all data equally, considering every 
response.
Thus, the validity of the research results is ensured by applying methods of analysis that 
are generally used in the political and social sciences, as well as adhering to well-established 
conventions regarding their realisation. Reliability is ensured by keeping a very careful and precise 
record of each stage of the research. 
4. Empirical research findings
4.1 Clan affiliations and employment (including the public sector)
One interesting finding from online surveys is that few respondents use their clans in workplaces 
– only 12% of all respondents answered that they use their clans in their job places. But when the 
question was posed whether they support the use of clan belonging in employment, this figure 
went down to 4%, and 8% of young people were neutral. Other respondents neither used clan 
affiliation at work nor supported its usage in employment. These results stand in contrast to the 
existing literature. The high disapproval levels might indicate that young people did not want to 
reveal that they followed such practices. This would align with the findings of some scholars, such 
as Schatz (2004), who points out that most people choose to conceal their clan practices rather 
than disclose them. Responses to online surveys were also very different from interview responses, 
which are presented below.
Several interviewees from Aqtau and Shymkent said they had experienced the influences of clan 
divisions in job interviews, while respondents from Nur-Sultan reported no questions on clan 
identifications in job interviews. One of the interviewees in Shymkent shared his experience:
“Once there was a free vacancy and there were three candidates for this position including 
me. As a result, the candidate with the same Ru as the head of the company was hired. Later, I 
found out that all of us had been asked about our Ru clans during the job interviews.” (Bagila, 
22 years old, Shymkent)
Furthermore, according to interviewees from Aqtau (Junior Zhuz), employers in the city tended 
always to ask questions about clan affiliations in job application. One interviewee even said: 
“Employers always ask Ru clans in job interviews in Mangystau region, and even they first ask our Rus 
then our full names” (Aizhan, 22 years old, Aqtau). Another interviewee said that Qazaqs could 
benefit from Ru clan affiliations not only in job applications but also in workplaces and business 
trips: “Employers accept you as a ‘little brother’ with kindness, mildness and a desire to help at work 
if you are the same Ru member as the employers are. Besides, when you are on a business trip, your Ru 
helps to build a good relationship with your local colleagues” (Yerzhan, 25 years old, Aqtau).
The vast majority of interviewees from Nur-Sultan (capital city/Middle Zhuz) and some interviewees 
from Shymkent (Senior Zhuz) claimed that their clan affiliation could affect their chances of 
getting a job in the public sector. This stands in contradiction to the above statement by Middle 
Zhuz interviewees about the absence of clan-related questions in job interviews. The Middle Zhuz 
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interviewees explained this contradiction by pointing to the lack of job interviews in the selection 
process, as a rule, as well as the different application process for public sector roles than those 
in other employment sectors. One interviewee said that it was highly possible that the public 
sector sought to hire Senior Zhuz members, explaining the phenomenon with the following Qazaq 
proverb: 
“Ұлы жүзге қамшы бер де малға қой,
  Орта жүзге қалам бер де дауға қой,
  Кіші жүзге найза бер де жауға қой.”
                                                             (Майқы-би)
  [“Give a whip to Senior Zhuz and let it manage domestic animals,
  Give a pencil to Middle Zhuz and let it solve disputes,
  Give a spear to Junior Zhuz and let it defend [us] from the enemy.”
                                                                (Maiqy-bi)]
(Serik, 19 years old, Nur-Sultan).
In this proverb, the management of domestic animals means the public administration of the 
Qazaq Khanate, which was based on a pastoral economy of nomads at the time of Zhuz and Ru 
emergence. According to this interviewee, human resources managers in the public sector still 
base their decisions on clan affiliation and give preference to Senior Zhuz members in Nur-Sultan, 
the capital city of Qazaqstan. This conclusion supports the results of Minbaeva and Muratbekova-
Touron’s (2013, pp. 109, 125-126) analysis, that is, state-owned companies are strongly affected by 
clannism. Likewise, Liyassova et al. (2013, pp. 35-36) argue that a special form of protectionism 
occurs in the selection and placement of personnel in modern Qazaqstan, especially in the 
southern part, which is the Senior Zhuz region. Suleimenov (www.bsblog.info, 2013) makes a 
similar argument about the domination of the southern clans (Senior Zhuz) in the most powerful 
economic and political positions in Qazaqstan.
In contrast, all Junior Zhuz interviewees from Aqtau stated that their clan affiliation did not affect 
their chances of being hired in the public sector. One of them had the experience of working in 
Gossluzhba [public sector] and said he did not feel his Ru had any influence.
Overall, despite the minimal evidence (10%) in online surveys of the use of clans in workplaces, 
the results of interviews were very interesting and somewhat surprising. Respondents from the 
Middle Zhuz (Nur-Sultan) said they had received no questions about their clans in job interviews. 
However, they simultaneously claimed that their clan affiliations could influence their chances 
of getting a job in the public sector because there is a different application procedure for public 
sector roles. Conversely, respondents from the Junior Zhuz region (Aqtau) perceived an opposite 
pattern: they thought that their clan affiliations did not affect their chances of being employed in 
the public sector, but did influence other kinds of job interviews. Last, young Qazaqs in the Senior 
Zhuz region said that they thought clan affiliations could affect both job interviews more generally 
and their chances of being employed in the public sector. Taken together, these responses suggest 
that young Qazaqs believe Zhuz and Rus might influence employment in modern Qazaqstan, with 
their effects varying across Zhuz regions and employment sectors. These results also demonstrate 
the perception that clans have continued their legacy by adapting to modern conditions and 
becoming a ‘grey’ part of employment in Qazaqstan. By differentiating the significance of clan 
effects across various Zhuz and employment sectors, one can more clearly see why certain young 
Qazaqs emphasised the importance of clannism in employment in particular.
4.2 Blood purity and progeny health
Many respondents (strongly) supported following the rules of clan affiliation in their marriage 
(Table 4). Less than one fifth of all 200 respondents did not (strongly) support these rules. 
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Table 4: Do you support the idea of using clan belonging in marriage?
Source: Own design based on fieldwork
Furthermore, all online survey respondents were asked if they had been married and, if so, 
whether they followed the rules of clan divisions, especially Ru rules, in their marriage. Very few 
participants (11%) indicated that they did not abide by clan rules in their marriage, while more 
than half (55%) of all married respondents revealed that they had in fact followed clan rules in 
their matrimony. The other 34% of respondents found this question difficult to answer. Another 
question asked unmarried respondents whether they planned to follow Ru rules in marriage. 
The overall response to this question was quite positive: the overwhelming majority of single 
respondents (80%) indicated that they planned to follow the clan rules, that is, not to get married 
to a person from the same Ru, counting back seven ancestors on both their fathers’ and mothers’ 
lineages. 
Turning to the results of the interviews, all interviewees except one stated that Ru had (would) 
impact(ed) on their marriage and they had (would) ask(ed) about clan affiliation of their partners 
as a necessary question. One respondent said that Rus directly affected not only marriage, but 
also building a relationship, because Ru affiliation is asked along with the name of a partner at 
the first meeting (Aizhan, 22 years old, Aqtau). She further added, “We, the people of Mangystau, 
immediately ask someone’s Ru name, because what if I do not ask and then fall in love? It is better to 
ask it right after I become interested in that person”. Some interviewees believed that it was better to 
have a marriage with a representative of a different Zhuz than Ru, while others claimed that it was 
acceptable to marry people with the same Ru if the ancestors of the male and female sides were 
separate for at least seven ancestors on both the fathers’ and mothers’ lineages. All respondents 
except one based their positions on the effects of clans on blood purity. 
The interviewee who did not have similar views as other respondents asserted that he would not 
ask his future partner about her clan affiliation, but instead he would look at her human dignity 
(Nursultan, 24 years old, Shymkent).
Finally, all participants of online surveys were kindly asked to indicate whether they find Ru to 
be an effective ‘tool’ for preserving the purity of blood among Qazaqs. Almost three-quarters of 
online survey respondents (strongly) agreed that Ru is helpful for preserving blood purity amongst 
Qazaqs. Throughout the course of the interviews, all respondents except one stated that they 
believed that Ru is an effective ‘tool’ to preserve the purity of blood among Qazaqs. They claimed 
that if they did not follow clan rules, they might have unhealthy offspring with a mutation. One 
respondent shared an acquaintance’s experience: “One of my acquaintances from the same Ru got 
married and later all [one’s] children were born with some diseases. This proves the role of clans in the 
purity of blood” (Bagila, 22 years old, Shymkent). Many interviewees believed that if one did not 
follow the rules of clans in one’s marriage, then one would have mutated children and hereditary 
diseases in future offspring. 
Zhuz 
affiliation
Strongly 
do not 
support
Do not 
support Neutral Support
Strongly 
support
Do not 
know To
ta
l
(%)
Senior 7 3.5% 10 5% 6 3% 43 21.5% 27 13.5% 4 2% 95 47.5%
Middle 4 2% 8 4% 6 3% 30 15% 16 8% 3 1.5% 68 34%
Junior 2 2% 2 1% 2 1% 13 6.5% 5 2.5% 0 0.5% 25 12.5%
Non-Zhuz 4 2% 1 0.5% 1 0.5% 1  0.5% 2 1% 0 0% 9 4.5%
No answer 0 0% 1 0.5% 0 0% 1 0.5% 1 0.5% 0 0% 3 1.5%
Total (%) 17 8.5% 22 11% 15 7.5% 88 44% 51 25.5% 7 3.5% 200 100%
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However, one person was not on the same ‘bank of the river’, that is, he contested the view of 
blood purity by saying that same-Ru marriage did not affect the likelihood of offspring diseases 
(Nursultan, 24 years old, Shymkent).
In a similar vein as the majority of respondents indicated, a strong relationship between clans 
and blood purity is reported in the Qazaq-language literature. Many scholars (e.g. Medeuov, 
2011; Qozhambetova, 2013; Yergali, 2014; Abdibekov, 2015; Bolsanbek, 2016; Ospan, 2017) assert 
that Qazaq clans’ use of the ‘seven ancestors’ system provides blood purity and genealogical 
cleanliness. Otherwise, as Abzhan (2014, p. 56) argues, Qazaqs might face genetic disorders and 
hereditary diseases. Even Abdibekov (2015, p. 27) proposes reaching ‘40 ancestors’ in order to 
have spotless blood and allow marriages between the same Ru representatives. The findings of 
this research highly support the prevalence of these assertions, especially the results of semi-
structured interviews. 
It can be concluded that all interviewees except one believed in blood purity, which they argued 
should be followed by Rus because they believed mutation and other blood-related diseases could 
affect their future descendants if they did not follow clan rules. That is why, as they mentioned, 
they preferred to know their partners’ Rus before their marriage. It would give them a reason to 
decide whether their partners are the right choices or not. These results were further supported 
by online survey findings. It is also obvious that clans play a significant role in marriage for many 
participants, because, as shown above, they find clan affiliation and rules as effective ‘tools’ to 
preserve blood purity.
In conclusion, all interviewees but one believed in the importance of following marriage-related 
clan rules in order to maintain blood purity, which they and many Qazaq academics have argued 
will lessen the likelihood of genetic mutations in offspring. That is why, they said, they preferred 
to know their partners’ Rus in advance of their marriages; it would give them the opportunity 
to decide whether their partners were the right choices. These results were further supported 
by online survey responses, with many individuals supporting the use of clan rules to determine 
marriages and preserve blood purity.
4.3 New platforms for modern Qazaq clans
Of the 200 respondents to the online surveys, 14 young people indicated that they had ever participated 
in online political events or discussions related to clan divisions, whilst 11 found it difficult to say. 
More than half of the interviewees and 19 respondents of online surveys indicated that they used 
the ‘Zheti Ata’ application regularly. These findings show that online platforms are useful venues for 
studying clan relations, especially given the growing trend of internet users in Qazaqstan.
Some interviewees stated that both clan members and non-members could generate political 
activism, within certain limits. They supported only legal activism and opposed tribalism if they 
thought it violated people’s rights since, as they said, tribes were not officially registered and lacked 
legal status. One respondent asserted that clans could cause diverse consequences, such as the 
emergence of new cleavages, noting, “I have found a group in VKontakte, which is called ‘Aday’ [a Ru 
inside of Junior Zhuz]. They call others with slogans such as “If you are Qazaq, be as Aday” or “If you are 
Qazaq, you are Aday” […]” (Bolat, 22 years old, Nur-Sultan). This assertion and quote match those 
observed in western Qazaqstan – Qazaqs there self-identify themselves first as ‘Junior Zhuz’ people, 
not as Qazaqs (Mitskevich, 2013). He further pointed out that he would not personally go on strike 
but would rather try to solve any kinds of discontent either legally where appropriate or using clan 
contacts if needed. 
Additionally, some interviewees (e.g. Bolat, 22 years old, Nur-Sultan) argued that clans might generate 
political activism by gathering to a Kurultai [local political ‘meeting’], whilst others (e.g. Aizhan, 22 
years old; Yerzhan, 25 years old, Aqtau) thought it can be done via online platforms such as social 
networks. For example, one of them further explained:
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“I think that clans can generate political activism through Facebook against recent land 
disputes, because it is difficult, even impossible, to raise dissatisfaction with the recent 
amendments of the law on land, living in remote areas of Qazaqstan. Clans can be effective 
[ties] to unite people against these kinds of political decisions.” (Aizhan, 22 years old, Aqtau).
It seems that Qazaqs find themselves more united by clans and use their clan belonging to oppose 
political events; at least, they attach their own clans to political issues as a supporting institution. 
In reviewing the literature, no data were found on the association between clans and political 
activism. However, the results of semi-structured interviews show that Zhuz and Ru affiliations 
might generate political activism in the forms of political discussions and civic engagement. The 
chances of these activities occurring depends on the context, and they are most likely to take place 
online. This means that clans might assist young people’s online political activism, but whether 
they can cause offline political participation is ultimately an empirical question, as there is a 
distinction between virtual political activism and real political offline actions. The internet’s role 
in young people’s political activism is particularly relevant in this case, as the findings of Kim et 
al. (2017, p. 899) show the positive potential of online political activism in the political lives of 
young people. According to the findings of this research, we can infer that online platforms such 
as the ‘Zheti Ata’ application, Facebook, and VK might assist in generating online political activism 
among young participants on clan issues. 
To summarise, both online survey and interview results show that young people say they already 
participate in political events and/or discussions raised by Zhuz and Ru divisions, particularly on 
online platforms, which might result in increased political activism. The power of online activism 
and its implications should not be underestimated. Many studies (e.g. Naumov, 2014; Halupka, 
2014; Wilkin et al., 2015) have shown that online political activism is not always the final part of 
political participation, but rather is just the beginning of the political ‘repertoire’ in the internet 
era, ‘especially for younger people’ (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2014, p. 627). Collins (2004, p. 245) also 
asserts that inexpensive mobilisation and political participation could be reached by clan elites 
using clans ‘in ‘crowding out’, a process by which they participate politically through their network 
and effectively crowd out non-clan forms of association or participation’.
5. Conclusions
This is the first empirical study that explores young Qazaqs’ perspectives on how Zhuz and Ru clan 
divisions affect their lives. This work focused on three cities, using an exploratory sequential mixed-
methods research design to understand young people’s clan-based experiences and attitudes, as 
well as their assessments of the role of generic criteria. The study found that clan divisions are 
seen to affect marriage, employment, and online media use.
In the course of the research, young people explained that they felt Zhuz and Ru clan identities 
strongly affected job interviews, although the strength of these effects varied in Zhuz regions 
and across employment sectors. Perceived impacts were particularly significant in the case of 
Junior Zhuz members. Further findings showed that clan identities were seen to impact young 
people’s chances of being employed in the public sector, especially among Senior and Middle Zhuz 
members. The overwhelming majority of young respondents also said they did not use Zhuzes 
and Rus in their workplaces. One possible explanation for these results is that clan affiliations are 
seen to play a role in the job application process, but are less significant in the workplace itself. 
Another possible explanation is that the online survey respondents concealed discriminatory clan 
practices because all of them were either employees or students at the time of their participation. 
This finding illustrates that the concealing of clans is a legacy of Soviet times that exists still in 
present day Qazaqstan.
This study has also found that Rus are seen to have a profound influence on the marriages of 
young Qazaqs, and even on pre-marriage relationships. A possible explanation for this might be 
that young Qazaqs accept Rus as the only proper ‘tool’ by which it is possible to preserve the purity 
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of blood. This means that young Qazaqs still learn Rus, and consequently also Zhuzes, by heart 
and practice them in their marriages because the vast majority of Rus belong to Zhuzes. Thus, this 
study contributes to our broader understanding of the development of clan relations in the XXI 
century. 
Moreover, the results of the research and literature review have shown that the internet and 
social media provide modern Qazaq clans with new online platforms, at least in clan debates, 
political discussions, and, possibly, online political activism. The potential role of clans in political 
participation needs further investigation, as politics was not the primary focus of this study and so 
it did not delve into the question in great detail. The fact that Zhuzes and Rus are discussed widely 
on the internet and the record-breaking clan-oriented ‘Zheti Ata’ application proves that modern 
Qazaq clans have new platforms to utilise. Further research is needed on the clans’ relationship 
with these online platforms.
Overall, these results suggest that young people believe clans affect them both negatively and 
positively in the contexts of the workplace, online media, and marriage. While some individuals 
might see themselves as suffering from ‘clan clientelism’, which they say occurs across power 
hierarchies in workplaces, others might perceive themselves as benefiting from effective kinship 
ties. This tension results in both positive and negative consequences. Moreover, marriage that is 
in accordance with set clan rules is widely seen as important; this might play a role in shaping and 
perpetuating the persistence of Ru clans in modern Qazaqstan. It is possible that Zhuz clans and 
their practices persist in large part because of the continued significance attributed to Rus, given 
that most Rus belong to Zhuzes and they are generally practiced together.
6. Recommendations for future research
The author recognises that this research study deals with a small number of respondents living 
within the boundaries of three cities, thus leaving significant space for further research. First, 
the participants under examination were young Qazaqs aged from 18 to 29 in three big cities in 
Qazaqstan, which makes it difficult to generalise to the perceived effects of clans on all young 
Qazaqs. Although there are sound reasons why these three cities were chosen, it would be 
worthwhile to expand research to, for instance, other cities in west, central and east Qazaqstan, 
as well as to villages, in order to gauge how clans affect youth on a broader scale. 
Second, it would be particularly helpful to evaluate the attitudes of ‘non-clan members’ of the 
Qazaq society – that is, other nationalities – toward clan-based divisions, as non-clan members 
account for 35% of the overall population of Qazaqstan (National Statistical Committee, 2018). 
Third, to draw a complete picture of the perceived clan influences on young people, it would 
be useful to study employers, elites and/or policymakers too. In so doing, the question of how 
Zhuz and Ru clan-based kinship divisions are seen to affect youth in Qazaqstan would need to 
be answered by a triangulation of young Qazaqs, young non-Qazaqs, and potential employers/
policymakers.
Finally, this research could be extended by including quantitative methods such as content analysis 
of relevant keywords in online media and/or discourses. This would not only provide us with an 
understanding of the specific discourses’ relative frequency, but would also give further depth 
to the research field. This, in turn, would allow researchers to make broader and more detailed 
conclusions, paving the way for new research on topics such as concealed clan relations as well as 
the relationships between clan affiliations and political activism among ordinary citizens.
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